Whatever happens in the fragile peace talks in Switzerland between Iran and the US, Qatar will be living with the war’s economic consequences for years.
It suffered perhaps the most devastating single strike of the conflict on March 18, when Iranian missiles hit Trains 4 and 6 at Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest liquefied natural gas export facility.
In a matter of hours, Qatar lost 17 percent of its annual export capacity for what the emirate’s energy chiefs estimate will be three to five years. Annual revenue losses could run to $20 billion.
That figure alone puts Qatar in a different category from its Gulf neighbours, which also suffered significant attacks on energy infrastructure. But Saudi Arabia had Yanbu, and the UAE had Fujairah.
Qatar has nothing: no bypass pipeline, no alternative export route, no Red Sea option. More than 90 percent of its exports transit the Strait of Hormuz and, unlike oil, LNG cannot be rerouted overland.
When Hormuz closed, Qatar’s export system stopped. When Ras Laffan was hit, its basic economic model was shaken.
The arithmetic is brutal. Qatar began 2026 expecting substantial growth, with the North Field expansion due to come online from mid-year, adding significant LNG production capacity and cementing the country’s position as the world’s dominant gas exporter.
Instead, JPMorgan economists say, the country will see a 14 percentage-point swing into negative growth, forecasting a 9 percent GDP contraction for 2026. The IMF puts it at 8.6 percent.
Capital Economics, at the more pessimistic end of the range, puts the contraction at 14 percent, with the North Field delay removing the production uplift that had underpinned every pre-war growth projection.
The war forced a choice between roles Qatar had spent two decades trying to avoid
S&P Global, the most sanguine of the major forecasters, estimates a 5 percent real contraction, while affirming Qatar’s AA sovereign credit rating with a stable outlook on 13 March. The rating agency expects LNG output to average 40 percent below pre-war levels for the full year but predicts a rebound to 4.8 percent average growth in 2027-2029 as production recovers.
The IMF similarly projects a sharp snapback to 8.5 percent in 2027. Capital Economics forecasts 12.8 percent growth.
The wide range reflects genuine uncertainty about both the Ras Laffan repair timeline and how quickly Hormuz transit normalises — a question left unanswered so far by the Versailles memorandum of understanding.
The repair timeline itself is similarly uncertain. Wood Mackenzie divides recovery into three phases: an initial restart of undamaged trains bringing capacity to 10-25 percent of pre-war levels within weeks of a durable ceasefire; a climb to around 80 percent by late 2026 as operable trains are recommissioned; and then a long plateau.
The final 20 percent — the two destroyed trains — cannot be restored until replacement gas turbines arrive. Only three manufacturers worldwide produce the required equipment, with delivery delays of two to four years. Full recovery is a 2028 story at the earliest, and possibly 2029 or 2030, says WoodMac.
Qatar, of course, has deep reserves to cushion the blow. The Qatar Investment Authority, with assets of approximately $520 billion, provides a formidable backstop. But that fiscal pot is not bottomless.
Doha had already moved from a surplus of $1.5 billion in 2024 to a deficit of $2.2 billion in 2025, before the first missile flew. S&P forecasts the deficit widening to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2026. Qatar has already issued $3 billion in bonds — its first significant borrowing in years.
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Economists agree that, as long as Hormuz remains blocked, Qatar will be running both a trade and fiscal deficit. It already recorded a $1.2 billion trade deficit during the closure, its first in years.
Beyond the numbers lies a geopolitical paradox the peace deal does not resolve. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US military installation in the Middle East. It also maintained back-channel communications with Tehran and positioned itself as the region’s pre-eminent mediator.
The war forced a choice between roles Qatar had spent two decades trying to avoid. The Versailles deal restored the ceasefire, but it leaves open the question of Qatar’s studied neutrality.
QatarEnergy’s reputation — built over decades through crises like Fukushima, Covid and Russia’s war against Ukraine — for never missing a delivery is now gone.
Whether long-term buyers who turned to US Gulf Coast terminals and Canadian LNG during the disruption will return in full is the question that will define Qatar’s energy future. That is well beyond the terms of any peace agreement.
Frank Kane is Editor-at-Large of AGBI and an award-winning business journalist