This is partly explained by a major revival in tourism as people embarked on foreign holidays again post-Covid.
Also, compared to Germany, this group of countries has a lower share of manufacturing in GDP and was not as hard hit by the surge in energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
But in Italy’s case, recent relatively strong growth has been mainly driven by a huge surge in construction output owing to a substantial tax incentive scheme led by Giorgia Meloni’s government.
This surge is likely to continue for a while longer but by the end of the year, it should be fading, not least because the tax incentive scheme is being wound down.
Moreover, it seems likely that capacity constraints will prevent construction activity from continuing much longer at this level. The upshot is that next year Italian growth will probably come in at something like 0.5pc, compared with a eurozone average of nearer 1pc.
When it comes to medium-term prospects, Jeremy Warner may be right that Italy has turned a corner.
There is certainly more political stability than Italy has been used to. But on economic prospects there is plenty of room for reasonable people to differ – and I do. Italy’s recent comparative success has done little to alter the picture of a country held back by major structural problems.
The country faces two key supply difficulties. First, the working population is set to fall considerably.
Admittedly, in Italy the female participation rate is pretty low by normal European standards and therefore there is some scope for the fall in working-age population to be compensated by an increase in the female participation rate.
Also, the retirement age is automatically geared to increasing longevity. Even so, these factors will not be enough to stop the labour force from declining over the coming years and decades.
The second problem is more serious. Productivity growth in Italy is pitifully low. This is, of course, a problem across most of the world but in Italy, the difficulties are deep-seated.