Brazilian environmental services company Ambipar ended last year with a reported cash position of R$2.5 billion, including R$1.2 billion held in a fund whose underlying asset was a federal claim at a stage preceding the issuance of a court-ordered payment order and carried at face value. Another R$247 million consisted of investments believed to be linked to Banco Master. Stakes in Emae and a receivables fund connected to Ambipar itself were also included in the total.
Cash, cash equivalents and investments at top-tier banks amounted to only R$295 million.
The figures were included in a presentation made by the company as part of an agreement with bondholders announced this week under the group’s bankruptcy protection proceedings.
A federal claim at the pre-payment-order stage refers to a credit owed by the federal government before it formally becomes a precatório, or court-ordered payment claim. At that point, the credit has already been recognized, but there is no indication of when payment will be made. Settlement can take years or even decades, making the asset illiquid and its realization uncertain.
Ambipar’s presentation shows that R$1.2 billion of its cash was invested in a fund that held certificates of deposit, or CDBs, until early September 2025, when they were replaced by the federal claim.
Such claims were used by Banco Master to inflate its balance sheet before the collapse of the financial institution controlled by Daniel Vorcaro.
Ambipar purchased R$500 million of Master assets for the Ásia receivables investment fund, or FIDC, in which the company was reportedly the sole investor, O Globo columnist Lauro Jardim disclosed. Filings available from Brazil’s Securities and Exchange Commission, or CVM, show that the fund holds R$1.2 billion in assets originated by a financial-sector company.
The relationship with the Master conglomerate appears to go further.
In its investor presentation, Ambipar said R$247.3 million of its cash consisted of “investments held at an institution currently undergoing liquidation,” although liquidation proceedings had not yet begun in December 2025.
Valor previously reported that Ambipar may have held securities issued by Voiter, formerly Banco Pleno, which was liquidated in February this year.
Those figures, together with reports from Ambipar’s court-appointed administrators obtained by Valor, indicate that the financial weakness of the company controlled by Tércio Borlenghi Jr. predated the crisis it attributed to a R$60 million margin call by Deutsche Bank on derivatives contracts.
Court-administration documents show that Ambipar claimed to have R$3.39 billion in cash at the end of September last year, one week after seeking protection from creditors.
The trial balances also show a sharp acceleration in interest payments, which reached R$1.6 billion in the final three months of last year, when the company was already under bankruptcy protection. Creditors interviewed by Valor, however, said they were receiving payments only on obligations outside the proceedings, such as leases and loans under the Finame equipment-financing program.
This is the first time information about Ambipar’s cash has emerged since the company filed for an injunction on September 24 to suspend debt payments. The measure was later converted into bankruptcy protection.
The data were submitted to the court in a sealed envelope and have remained confidential since then.
The figures shed some light on the company’s finances, but they also deepen the mystery surrounding what happened to the cash Ambipar said it held.
The court-appointed administrators’ report shows that Ambipar had R$1.42 billion in cash and equivalents and another R$1.96 billion in financial investments at the end of September, for a total cash position of R$3.39 billion.
Three months later, on December 31, the company reported R$634 million in cash and equivalents and R$1.84 billion in investments, for a total of R$2.48 billion.
The figures therefore represent a decline from the amounts reported in the company’s financial statements for the second quarter of 2025. At the end of June, Ambipar reported a cash position of R$4.71 billion, comprising R$2.61 billion in cash and equivalents, R$2.06 billion in a FIDC linked to the Borlenghi family and R$30.4 million in long-term financial investments.
The second-quarter 2025 financial statements were the last released before the crisis engulfed the company.
Soon after the results were presented, Ambipar creditors began questioning the company amid suspicions that its cash had been invested in CDBs issued by Master. Vorcaro’s bank had not yet been liquidated, but its looming collapse was already widely anticipated in the market.
In mid-September, bank executives sought explanations from Borlenghi, who was simultaneously seeking support for a debenture offering intended to ease pressure on Ambipar’s cash position. The planned R$3 billion transaction never took place.
Displeased, the businessman withdrew the money Ambipar had deposited at Santander and other financial institutions.
The attempt to issue debentures placed further pressure on the company’s bonds in the secondary market. The securities had already been hit by investors’ concerns over Master and Fitch Ratings’ downgrade of Ambipar’s credit rating.
To address those concerns, Ambipar told banks that its immediately available cash was invested in CDBs issued by institutions including Itaú Unibanco, BNB, Ajman Bank, Bancolombia and PNC—not Master.
Another portion was held in the Fênix FIDC. As Valor previously reported, the fund’s main receivables originator was Everest, a company owned by Borlenghi. In other words, Everest held receivables from Ambipar.
A further R$520 million was invested in units of the Africa fund, through which the businessman had purchased shares in Emae. The remainder was said to be held in bank securities without immediate liquidity at institutions including Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan and Banco de la Nación.
The explanations failed to convince creditors, and Ambipar filed for an injunction with the Rio de Janeiro State Court only days later.
Ambipar’s true financial position and the events that led to its collapse remain unclear.
The data submitted by the court-appointed administrator show that the company entered bankruptcy protection reporting a shrinking but still multibillion-real cash position. Curiously, that amount fell further while Ambipar was already protected by the courts and payments to unsecured creditors had been suspended.
The income statements show that the company recognized R$1.53 billion in financial expenses in the final quarter of last year.
That represented a sharp acceleration from the previous months. From January through September, financial expenses had totaled R$1.84 billion.
The increase was not matched by financial income, which came to R$146 million between October and December, after totaling R$996 million from January through the end of the third quarter.
Based on those figures, financial expenses last year were equivalent to 31% of the company’s reported total debt of R$10.7 billion.
Recognizing financial expenses, however, does not necessarily mean that cash was paid out at the same time. Income statements use accrual accounting, meaning expenses are recognized when the underlying event occurs rather than necessarily when funds enter or leave the company.
The cash-flow statements, which reflect actual movements of funds during the period, point in the same direction.
Reports from the court-appointed administrator show that Ambipar disbursed R$2.71 billion last year for interest on loans and financing, penalties and debentures, as well as leases, foreign-exchange variations and swaps.
More than half of that amount, or R$1.56 billion, was concentrated in the fourth quarter of 2025, when the company was already under bankruptcy protection. Nearly R$1.2 billion was paid out in December alone.
Ambipar had been expanding rapidly until 2024.
In the middle of that year, it later emerged, funds linked to Borlenghi, Master’s Vorcaro, Nelson Tanure and Maurício Quadrado participated in a series of transactions that drove up Ambipar shares.
The deals fueled market suspicions of unusually close ties between the company and Master.
The share purchases took place alongside transactions involving the Fênix FIDC, whose investors included Ambipar companies. The fund bought receivables held by one of Borlenghi’s companies against Ambipar itself.
In practice, the arrangement allowed money to be channeled out of Ambipar.
Shortly after the company sought the injunction, the fund booked a R$739.9 million provision.
In the investor presentation, the FIDC was valued at R$83.9 million in December after the provision. The Emae shares were valued at R$533 million, although they were sold to Sabesp this year for R$171.6 million.